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The issue of why ¯rms choose a multinational structure has received much atten-
tion in the modern theory of international trade. According to this theory, savings in
transportation costs and tari®-jumping arguments are among the core reasons for ¯rms
investing in more than a single country (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992). Tax savings,
on the other hand, have so far played hardly any role in this literature. This is surpris-
ing, because 70% of FDI in°ows and more than 90% of FDI out°ows occur between the
developed countries (Markusen, 2002, Table 1.2) which are characterized, on average,
by high corporate taxes, but relatively low tari®s and transportation costs.1 There is
by now substantial empirical evidence that multinational ¯rms are able to signi¯cantly
reduce their corporate tax burden by transfer pricing and other pro¯t shifting strategies
(Hines, 1999; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003). Moreover, a rising share of FDI occurs
in knowledge-based industries where a large part of earnings consists of royalties and
license fees that can easily be shifted internationally.2 While precise quanti¯cations re-
main di±cult, these tax savings are arguably at least as important from the perspective
of multinational ¯rms as the reduction of transportation costs or tari®s. Nevertheless,
the extensive literature on taxation and foreign direct investment (see Gresik, 2001
for a survey) has so far not considered taxes as a potential cause for the choice of a
multinational form, but has instead focussed almost exclusively on the consequences
for tax policy of the existence of multinational ¯rms.3
In this paper we present a model where ¯rms endogenously choose a national or a
multinational form, in response to the tax advantages accorded to a multinational
status. These tax advantages may come in one of several forms. In Europe, for exam-
1Using revenue collections as an indicator, tari® revenue was only about 10% of corporate tax
revenue in the United States in 2003 ($ 21 billion vs. $ 200 billion). In the European Union, the share
of tari® collections over corporate tax revenue is even lower, due to the high volume of tari®-free
intra-European trade. See OECD (2005).
2As an example, Microsoft has moved some of its R&D operations to a subsidiary in Dublin,
allowing the company to channel a disproportionate share of its pro¯ts from European sales to low-
tax Ireland (12.5% corporation tax). See Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2005.
3One exception is Janeba (2000), who analyzes the incentives for a monopolist to install capacities
in each of two countries, in order to induce tax competition between them.
1ple, governments increasingly grant special tax preferences to multinational enterprises
(MNEs) that are not extended to domestic ¯rms. The EU's Primarolo Report (1999)
lists a total of 66 examples of discriminatory tax preferences in favour of MNEs. A
typical case are Belgium's special tax rules for large, foreign-based corporations that
establish a coordination center in the country. Under this law, the normal statutory
tax rate is applied to a very narrow `notional' tax base, leading to e®ective tax rates
that are close to zero for most of the bene¯tting ¯rms (Primarolo Report, 1999, A 001).
While special tax laws favouring MNEs are a particularly visible kind of tax discrimi-
nation, they are not the only one. A weak enforcement of transfer pricing rules equally
grants MNEs a tax advantage over domestic ¯rms, and thus acts as a discriminatory
device.4 The importance of transfer pricing is well-documented for the United States.
Swenson (2001) ¯nds, for example, that tax reforms and the associated tari® changes
led to product-speci¯c changes in the reported values of U.S. imports from ¯ve OECD
countries, which systematically reduced the tax and tari® payments by US multina-
tional ¯rms. Similarly, Clausing (2003) analyzes US intra-¯rm trade prices and ¯nds
direct evidence of transfer pricing behavior: a lower corporate tax rate abroad is asso-
ciated with lower export prices from the U.S. and higher import prices into the U.S.,
other things being equal.
These examples demonstrate that discriminatory tax reductions in favour of mobile,
multinational ¯rms have become widespread. Moreover, tax discrimination can be ac-
tively in°uenced or controlled by national governments, and can therefore itself be
viewed as a strategic policy variable. Therefore, a central policy question in current
international tax relations has been whether this type of discrimination is collectively
desirable or self-defeating in a world where countries remains free to set capital tax
rates independently and a growing share of trade is carried out by MNEs.
In the political debate, the current consensus in both the OECD (1998) and the Euro-
pean Union seems to be that tax discrimination in favour of mobile ¯rms is both `unfair'
and `harmful'. The EU has adopted a Code of Conduct for business taxation (Euro-
4Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003, Table 1) give details { based on information collected by Ernst &
Young { on the formal enforcement of transfer pricing rules in 16 OECD countries. This comparison
documents substantial international di®erences in the enforcement of transfer pricing rules and their
econometric results indicate that a stricter control of these rules does indeed reduce pro¯t shifting.
2pean Communities, 1998) under which member states have committed themselves to
phase out existing tax preferences that either discriminate in favour of non-residents,
or are extended to ¯rms with no real economic activity in the country. Moreover, one
of the main motivations behind the current EU initiative to tax multinationals under
some form of formula allocation, rather than the current separate accounting system
(European Commission, 2001) is to reduce pro¯t shifting activities. Therefore, this
coordination measure also has an important element of enforcing non-discriminatory
corporate tax policies (G¶ erard, 2005). Similar policies have long been enacted in the
United States and Canada, where di®erent allocation formulas are used as a means
to keep ¯rms operating in di®erent sub-national jurisdictions from shifting pro¯ts into
low-tax states or provinces.5
From a theoretical perspective, it is by no means obvious, however, that discriminatory
tax policies are harmful in a world where national or sub-national jurisdictions are free
to choose corporate tax rates independently. Instead, tax rate competition may well be
intensi¯ed when the possibility to tax-discriminate between internationally mobile and
immobile ¯rms is reduced.
To capture the central features of the resulting interaction between countries and ¯rms,
two model elements are important in our view. The ¯rst is the long-term nature of most
tax concessions granted to MNEs, which are changed far less frequently than statutory
tax rates. This observation applies to both the formal enforcement of transfer pricing
rules, codi¯ed in national tax laws,6 and to many of the special tax preference schemes
that explicitly aim at organizational adjustments within the tax-favoured multinational
group. In the example of the Belgian coordination centers mentioned above, the tax
preferences implied by the narrow tax base have been in e®ect continuously since 1983.
Given this country's long-term commitment to maintain its tax preference, a large
number of multinational groups have been attracted to Belgium, despite the uncertainty
about the development of statutory tax rates, which were changed ¯ve times since the
5A study by Mintz and Smart (2004) con¯rms that formula allocation reduces pro¯t-shifting op-
portunities. They ¯nd for a sample of Canadian ¯rms that the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to tax rates is about twice as high for a±liated ¯rms that are taxed under separate accounting, as
compared to ¯rms that are subject to formula allocation.
6Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003, Table 1) show that among the 11 OECD countries in their sample
which do have explicit transfer pricing rules, only four have changed these rules during the 1990s.
3beginning of the preferential tax rule.7 The second model element, which has already
been mentioned above, is that long-term tax concessions o®er an incentive for ¯rms to
invest in a multinational structure, in order to bene¯t from these tax advantages.
In this paper we set up a model that incorporates these two elements and analyze
the e®ects that the ¯rms' endogenous choice of organizational form has on optimal
corporate tax policy. Speci¯cally, we model a sequential game between two symmetric
countries in which governments decide in a ¯rst stage on the degree of tax preferences
granted to internationally mobile ¯rms. Firms respond to these tax preferences by
deciding on whether to make a ¯xed investment to establish a subsidiary in another
country, in order to qualify for these preferences. In the ¯nal stage of the game, gov-
ernments compete for mobile capital by means of statutory corporate tax rates. The
central question underlying the analysis is whether a coordinated reduction in the tax
preferences granted to mobile ¯rms is in the interest of the competing countries, given
that tax rates in the ¯nal stage remain to be chosen non-cooperatively.
Our analysis relates to two di®erent strands in the literature. A ¯rst group of papers
explicitly compares inter-jurisdictional tax competition under discriminatory vs. non-
discriminatory tax regimes. Janeba and Peters (1999) show that a mutual agreement
to refrain from tax discrimination is Pareto improving in a setting where two countries
compete for a tax base that is perfectly mobile internationally, but at the same time are
able to tax a completely inelastic domestic tax base. Keen (2001), in contrast, reaches
the opposite conclusion in a model where both tax bases are internationally mobile,
albeit to a di®erent degree, and the aggregate size of each tax base is ¯xed. Janeba and
Smart (2003) generalize Keen's model and provide a synthesis of the conditions under
which a preferential tax treatment of the more mobile base is bene¯cial or harmful for
the competing countries. Finally, Haupt and Peters (2005) show that the policy case
for a ban on preferential tax regimes is strengthened when investors have a `home bias'.
All these contributions model tax discrimination as a single-stage game and assume
that capital tax bases di®er exogenously in the degree of international mobility.
A second strand in the literature focuses on the strategic use of tax enforcement policies.
Cremer and Gahvari (2000) analyze the implications of tax evasion for ¯scal competi-
7See Weichenrieder (1996) for a detailed account of the response of German ¯rms to this and other
special tax schemes in the EU.
4tion in a federal economy. Their benchmark result establishes that competing countries
will choose ine±ciently low tax and audit rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Per-
alta, Wauthy and van Ypersele (2003) analyse a two-stage game between asymmetric
countries which compete for the pro¯ts of a single multinational ¯rm by means of the
corporation tax rate and a tax enforcement variable. In their analysis, tax enforcement
is used as a strategic instrument to in°uence the rival country's subsequent choice of
tax rate. Finally, a direct precursor to our work is Hong and Smart (2005). They con-
sider a general equilibrium model of a single small open economy which chooses both
its statutory tax rate and the degree of tax sheltering given to multinationals. A core
result of their analysis is that an increase in income shifting allows the government of
the small country to increase its tax rate. None of these papers, however, endogenizes
the decision of ¯rms to invest in a multinational organizational form.
Our analysis yields the following results. When the ¯rms' choice of organizational
form responds inelastically to tax advantages, then countries will choose a high level
of tax preferences in the ¯rst stage of the game, and set the statutory tax rate on
immobile ¯rms at the maximum possible level in the last. In this regime, the optimal
coordinated policy is indeed to reduce the number of tax loopholes for multinationals.
If, however, the response of ¯rms' organizational form to tax preferences is elastic, then
non-cooperative policies will consist of a moderate level of tax discrimination chosen
in the ¯rst stage of the game, and an interior level of the statutory tax rate in the
last. A coordinated policy should then increase, rather than reduce, the degree of tax
discrimination, in order to soften the competition via corporate tax rates in the last
stage of the game. We will argue that these results may hold quite di®erent implications
for the policy initiatives mentioned above, which aim at eliminating speci¯c tax breaks
for foreign-based multinationals on the one hand, and at reducing the pro¯t shifting
opportunities of MNEs on the other.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 ana-
lyzes tax rate competition in the last stage of the game. Section 4 describes the choice
of organizational form by ¯rms. Section 5 analyzes non-cooperative discrimination poli-
cies in the ¯rst stage. Section 6 turns to the welfare e®ects of coordinated changes in
discrimination policies. Section 7 discusses our results and Section 8 concludes.
52 The model
We analyze a model where two identical countries compete in capital tax rates and
in the tax advantages granted to MNEs, while ¯rms endogenously choose their or-
ganizational form.8 We consider the following sequence of events. In the ¯rst stage,
governments decide on the degree of tax discrimination between mobile and immobile
¯rms. In the second stage, capital owners decide on whether to invest a lump sum in
order to become a mobile, multinational ¯rm, or remain an immobile, domestic ¯rm. In
the third stage, governments choose statutory capital tax rates. Finally, mobile ¯rms
decide where to produce and production and consumption plans are realized. All agents
perfectly anticipate future decisions and the model is solved by backward induction.
Hence the description in this and the following section treats the decision of ¯rms to
be mobile or immobile as exogenous, and derives the sub-game perfect solution for the
non-cooperative choice of tax rates.
Consider then two identical countries i 2 f1;2g, which form a federation. The (rep-
resentative) resident of each of countries 1 and 2 owns e units of capital. The capital
invested and employed in country i is denoted ki. Internationally mobile and immobile
capital are perfect substitutes in the production of output. Full employment of the
¯xed aggregate supply of capital implies
k1 + k2 = 2 e: (1)
The production function f(ki) exhibits the usual properties f0(ki) > 0;f00(ki) < 0.
Each country's capital endowment is divided between hi units of immobile capital and
¹ mi units of mobile capital, where hi and ¹ mi are predetermined at this stage of the game
e = hi + ¹ mi i 2 f1;2g: (2)
Mobile capital can locate anywhere in the federation costlessly, whereas immobile cap-
ital cannot be moved at all. The quantity of mobile capital employed in country i is
endogenous, and is denoted mi. The total quantity of capital mobile and immobile, in
country i is thus
ki = hi + mi 8 i 2 f1;2g hi;mi ¸ 0; (3)
8Throughout our analysis, the terms capital and ¯rms are used interchangeably.
6where equations (1){(3) imply that ¹ m1 + ¹ m2 = m1 + m2.
All capital employed in country i is taxed at source, and at the same statutory rate ti.
However, mobile capital faces a lower e®ective rate, since it can shelter income. Let
1¡Ái be the share of capital income which can be sheltered from tax so that Ái measures
to which extent the two countries enforce taxes on mobile capital.9 To keep our model
as simple as possible we do not incorporate any costs of this tax sheltering, and hence
do not model an optimal tax avoidance decision taken by mobile ¯rms.
With tax sheltering the e®ective tax rate on mobile capital in country i is
¿i ´ Ái ti; 0 · Ái · 1: (4)
The gross return to capital in country i is f0(ki). Following a standard simpli¯cation,
we assume that taxes are imposed per unit of capital so that the net return for a unit
of mobile capital is f0(ki)¡¿i. If there is some mobile capital employed in each country,
then this net return must be equalized between countries. Hence
r = f
0(ki) ¡ ¿i = f
0(kj) ¡ ¿j 8 i;j; i 6= j; (5)
where r is the endogenous net return to mobile capital in the federation. Together with
the capital market clearing condition (1), this determines the allocation of capital as
a function of the e®ective tax rates ¿i in each country.10 The response of the capital
tax base to a change in each country's e®ective tax rate is determined by implicitly
di®erentiating (5). This yields the conventional result that the capital tax base in each












> 0 8 i;j; i 6= j: (6)
Immobile capital faces the full statutory tax rate. Hence, while mobile and immobile
capital receive the same gross return, immobile capital bears a higher tax burden and
9One possible example of this sort of sheltering is \thin capitalization", whereby the ¯rm borrows
money from an a±liate in a tax haven located outside the federation. Here 1 ¡ Ái would indicate the
fraction of its capital costs which can be deducted in country i. See Mintz and Smart (2004).
10Notice that, if each country employs some of the mobile factor, the allocation of capital across
countries, and the net return to mobile capital, can both be expressed solely as a function of the
e®ective tax rates and the total stock of capital. They do not depend directly on the tax shifting
parameter, nor on the division of capital between mobile and immobile.




0(ki) ¡ ti = r ¡
1 ¡ Ái
Ái
¿i 8 i : (7)
In the following, it proves convenient to de¯ne a measure for the degree of tax discrim-




; 1 > ½i ¸ 0 : (8)
If taxes on mobile capital are fully enforced (Ái = 1) there is no discrimination and
½i = 0. In contrast, in the absence of any enforcement of taxes on mobile capital
(Ái ! 0), the tax preference for MNEs becomes arbitrarily large and ½i ! 1. From
the de¯nition of ½i and (7) the tax advantage of a unit of mobile capital over a unit of
immobile capital is given by ti ¡ ¿i = ½i¿i.
As immobile capital will be taxed more heavily, its taxation may reach an upper bound.
An obvious constraint is that the net return to immobile capital must be non-negative.
Since ki = e in any symmetric equilibrium, this constraint implies an exogenous ceiling
for the statutory tax rate equal to t = f0(e). This ceiling will in turn constrain the
e®ective tax rate on mobile capital, if the discrimination parameter ½i is su±ciently









There is a representative individual in each jurisdiction, who owns the region's capital
endowment and receives residual labour income f(ki)¡f0(:) ki, which remains untaxed.
Using (5) and (7), private consumption of the representative individual is
xi = f(ki) ¡ f
0(:) ki + e r ¡ ½i ¿i hi 8 i; (10)
whereas the total tax revenue collected by the source-based capital tax is
gi = ¿i(ki + ½ihi) 8 i: (11)
The government maximizes the utility function of the representative agent, given by
ui = xi + (1 + ") gi = f(ki) + (e ¡ ki) r + "¿i(ki + ½ihi) 8 i; (12)
8where (5), (10) and (11) have been used in the second step. The utility function (12)
exhibits a constant marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private
good, where 1 + " is the marginal cost of public funds and " represents the exogenous
excess burden of the tax system.11 For any " > 0, countries would like to coordinate
on high e®ective tax rates on capital, since this provides a non{distortionary source of
funding for the public sector.
3 Last stage: Tax rates
In the ¯nal stage of the game, governments choose their capital tax rates. Since the
discrimination parameter ½i is already ¯xed at this stage, it does not matter whether the
statutory tax rate or the e®ective tax rate is considered as choice variable: equation (4)
shows the relation between ti and ¿i for any given level of Ái. In the following it will
prove more convenient to treat the e®ective tax rates ¿i as strategic variables.
Substituting (10) and (11) in (12) and di®erentiating with respect to ¿i gives each
country's optimal e®ective tax rate
"(ki + ½ihi) + (1 + ") ¿i
@ki
@¿i
+ (e ¡ ki)
@r
@¿i
= 0 8 i = 1;2: (13)
We assume that each country's maximand (12) is a quasi{concave function of its own
e®ective tax rate12 as long as hi < ki, so that the solution to (13) de¯nes country i's best
response to the tax rate chosen by country j. We also assume here that the countries
choose identical discrimination parameters ½i in the ¯rst stage of the game. Given this
symmetry, a symmetric equilibrium in which ¿1 = ¿2 is of particular interest.
The best response function implicitly de¯ned by (13) shows how tax preferences to
multinationals can alter the incentives to cut taxes. The ¯rst term measures the mar-
ginal bene¯t of raising the e®ective tax rate. These gains include the additional tax
11The assumption of an exogenous excess burden " implies that other distortionary taxes raise
the bulk of each country's revenue. This is supported by the empirical observation that corporate
income tax revenue has accounted for less than 10% of total tax revenues (including social security
contributions) in the OECD average during the last decades (OECD, 2005).
12This will be the case if the production function is quadratic. However, as is well{known in the tax
competition literature, it is di±cult to ¯nd weaker restrictions on the primitives of the model which
ensure that this assumption holds.
9revenues collected from immobile domestic capital, as measured by the term ½ihi. The
second term describes the marginal loss from an increase in ¿, which results from a
reduction in the capital tax base. Finally, the last term represents an intertemporal
terms of trade e®ect, which disappears in a symmetric equilibrium where ki = e.
The e®ective tax pair ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I will be a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium if
¿i = ¿I is a best response of country i to ¿j = ¿I. Equation (13) implies that there is






00(e)](e + ½h) : (14)
Note that ¿I is rising in the excess burden parameter ", and it is positive for any
positive value of ".
To ensure that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in Regime I, none of the countries
must have an incentive to switch to a high-tax strategy where it fully expropriates the
return to immobile capital while allowing all mobile capital to move to the other region.
This possibility is analyzed extensively in Janeba and Peters (1999), in a model where
any tax di®erential induces all the mobile capital to move to the lower{tax jurisdiction.
We assume that countries will not ¯nd it optimal to choose this strategy, of letting all
the mobile capital locate elsewhere. This will be the case if the amount of mobile capital
is not too low, and if the marginal cost of public funds is not too high. Appendix 1
provides the details.
Recall, however, that there is an upper bound on ¿ given by (9), which will bind
for su±ciently high levels of ½. Therefore, there will be an interior symmetric Nash
equilibrium at ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I if and only if ¿I < ¿M. Otherwise, there will be a corner
solution with ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿M.
In the following we will refer to the interior Nash equilibrium with ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I as
Regime I, and to the corner Nash equilibrium with ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿M as Regime II. If
incentives to compete in tax rates were extremely low, the Nash equilibrium would
be in Regime II for any value of ½. This does not seem a very realistic possibility. To
ensure that an interior Nash equilibrium exists for some levels of ½i, it must be true
13Without any further assumptions, it can be shown that the second{order conditions for optimality
are satis¯ed in both countries when ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I. This result, proved by Bayindir{Upmann and Ziad
(2005), implies that ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I must be a second{order locally consistent equilibrium.










Condition (15) implies that neither the excess burden of the tax system nor the elas-
ticity of the marginal product of capital ¡f00(e)e=f0(e) are too large. In what follows
we assume that this condition is indeed met.14 Equilibrium to this tax{setting stage
can then be summarized by



















Either there is an interior Nash equilibrium with ¿¤ = ¿I (Regime I), or a corner Nash
equilibrium with ¿¤ = ¿M (Regime II).
In the interior Nash equilibrium of Regime I, implicit di®erentiation of (13) implies
that best response functions are upward-sloping and have a slope less than 1 in the






Our main interest lies in the response of ¿I
i to a change in the discrimination parameter




> 0 8 i: (17)
Hence, increasing the tax preference in favour of mobile capital raises the e®ective tax
rate on this base. It implies that when ½i is raised, the statutory tax rate ti will rise by
so much in this ¯nal stage that it overcompensates for the e®ect of the narrower tax
base for mobile ¯rms [cf. eq. (4)].
14A similar condition is needed to ensure that the equilibrium in the standard Wilson{Zodrow{
Mieszkowski model does not involve tax rates greater than 100%. For example, Assumption 3 in
Bayindir{Upmann and Ziad (2005) generalizes this condition to a variable cost of public funds, and
an arbitrary number of identical countries.
11Intuitively, the problem faced by the two countries in this ¯nal stage is that they
are legally constrained to levy the same statutory tax rate ti on both mobile and
immobile capital. As long as the excess burden of taxation is positive, they would like
to increase the e®ective tax rate on immobile capital, since that tax is non-distortionary.
However this tax increase will drive mobile capital into the other country. Hence, the
greater is the ability to discriminate among ¯rms (the larger is ½i), the more attractive
is it for each country to raise the e®ective rate of capital taxation. In other words,
comparing a given increase in the e®ective tax rate ¿i under a low and a high value
of the discrimination parameter ½i, the `costs' in terms of losing capital to the other
country are the same, but the gain in tax revenue arising from the extra taxation of
immobile ¯rms is larger when ½i is high [see the ¯rst term in eq. (13)]. Hence, increases
in ½i shift up each country's best response function, implying higher equilibrium tax
rates in Regime I.
In Regime II both countries impose the maximum e®ective tax ¿M = t=(1 + ½i), given
the pre-determined choice of ½i. Hence, there is no interaction between the e®ective
tax rates in the two countries (@¿M
i =@¿j = 0). Furthermore, the relationship between
½i and ¿i is negative in this regime, as a higher discrimination parameter reinforces the










(1 + ½i)2 < 0: (18)
These comparative static results are summarized in:
Proposition 2 In an interior (corner) Nash equilibrium, the e®ective tax rate on mo-
bile capital is rising (falling) in the degree of tax discrimination.
The symmetric equilibrium in Regime I arises only when each country chooses the same
degree of tax preference ½i. However, we can use the results of this section to consider
the e®ects on tax rates of a unilateral change in one country's ½i in the preceding
stage of the game. Equation (13) can be di®erentiated implicitly to derive these e®ects:
since each country's reaction function has a slope less than 1 [as stated in (16)], small
perturbations do not change the qualitative nature of the equilibrium.
124 Second stage: Firms' organizational form
In the tax setting stage of the game, the distribution of ¯rms between internationally
mobile and immobile types is exogenous. We now endogenize the decision of ¯rms to
choose their organizational form. This decision is driven by two con°icting considera-
tions. On the one hand mobile capital faces a lower e®ective tax rate and thus receives
a higher net return, as analyzed above. On the other hand, it is well-known from
the literature on foreign direct investment that becoming \mobile" involves choosing
a multinational organizational structure, which may be costly (see Horstmann and
Markusen, 1992; Markusen, 2002).15
In our setting we assume that there are ¯xed costs associated with establishing a
presence in a tax haven. These costs, denoted c, are ¯rm-speci¯c and distributed con-
tinuously in the interval (c;c) with density function g(c). Owners of capital compare
these ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs with the tax advantages of mobility. From (7) and (8),
the latter are given by ½i ¿i. Hence there is a critical level of ¯xed costs c¤, for which
½i ¿i ¡ c
¤ = 0: (19)
All ¯rms with c · c¤ choose to become mobile multinational ¯rms (mi), whereas ¯rms
with c > c¤ prefer to stay immobile (hi) and operate only in the residence country of
the capital owner. We assume that c < 0 and c > t. The ¯rst of these assumptions
re°ects the fact that there may be non-tax advantages to a multinational form for
some ¯rms, whereas the second assumption postulates that the costs of setting up a
subsidiary are su±ciently high for some ¯rms to exceed the maximum possible tax
advantage. Together these assumptions imply that there will always be some mobile
and some immobile ¯rms, for any set of tax policies chosen by the two governments.
The continued presence of mobile ¯rms, even when there are no tax preferences, is
crucial for some of the results below. Elimination of all tax preferences would be a
very attractive policy for governments, if this resulted in the complete elimination
of multinationals. Then countries would have no incentive to cut taxes below their
15Janeba (2000) considers a trade-o® that has some similarities with the one studied here. In his
model, a monopolist invests in excess capacities, spread over two countries, in order to induce tax
competition between the two hosts and lower its tax payments in equilibrium.
13statutory maximum rates in the subsequent stage: the corporate income tax would be
a lump{sum tax on domestic capital. But if some mobile ¯rms remain, even in the
absence of tax preferences, then countries will want to attract these ¯rms. In fact, with
tax preferences absent, tax rate competition in the ¯nal stage will be very similar to
the standard model where all capital is interregionally mobile, as a cut in e®ective
tax rates will cause no extra revenue leakage from domestic ¯rms in this case [see the
discussion of eq. (13) above].
Note that a rise in ½i a®ects the tax advantage to mobile ¯rms through both a direct
and an indirect e®ect. Holding tax rates constant, an increase in ½i directly increases
the bene¯t to a multinational form. But holding ½i constant, the induced change in
the e®ective capital tax rate will also a®ect the bene¯ts of being mobile, and capital
owners anticipate this additional (indirect) e®ect. In Regime I, both the direct and
the indirect e®ect work in the same direction, whereas in Regime II they work in
opposite directions. Substituting the equilibrium tax rate in Regime II shows that the
tax advantage ½i ¿i of multinational form equals t ½i=(1 + ½i), which is an increasing
function of ½i. Hence, in both regimes, an increase in ½i unambiguously reduces the












5 First stage: Discrimination policies
We now set up each government's problem of choosing the optimal non-cooperative
discrimination policy ½i. In this initial stage of the game, the private consumption
term in the utility function (12) must account for the aggregate costs that ¯rms pay
in equilibrium in order to become multinationals.16 The government objective is then
ui = f(ki) ¡ f
0(:) ki + ei r ¡ ¿i ½i hi ¡
Z c¤
c
cg(c)dc + (1 + ")¿i(ki + ½ihi): (21)
We di®erentiate with respect to ½i and employ symmetry and the arbitrage condi-
tion (19) for the last mobile ¯rm. Noting that ki[¿i;¿j(¿i)] and accounting for the
16These costs are treated as a pure waste of resources in the present model, because tax savings are
the only reason for choosing a multinational structure. In Section 7 we discuss the implications for
our results when these costs do not enter the government's optimization problem.

























Equation (22) is valid for both regimes discussed above. Note ¯rst that, when deciding
upon the level of ½i in the ¯rst stage of the game, each government will take account
of both the direct e®ect and the indirect e®ect (via the induced change in hi) that this
will have on the optimal e®ective tax rate ¿i in the ¯nal stage. In Regime I, we get




















00) h (1 ¡ ¹i) > 0 : (23)







as the absolute value of the elasticity with which the number of immobile ¯rms responds
to tax preferences. Note that this is a total elasticity, taking account of the direct and
indirect e®ects in eq. (20). We argue below that d¿i=d½ij
I > 0 must hold in Regime I.
In Regime II, only the direct e®ect matters and d¿i=d½ij
II = @¿M
i =@½i < 0 from (18).
We can now discuss the di®erent terms in (22). The ¯rst e®ect is zero in Regime I,
where the e®ective tax rate can be chosen optimally [see eq. (13)], but it is negative in
Regime II where d¿=d½i < 0 and each country is constrained in setting its optimal tax
rate (¿M
i < ¿I
i ). The second term describes the e®ect that the choice of ½i has on the
intensity of tax competition in the ¯nal stage of the game. This e®ect must be positive
in Regime I.17 Each country anticipates that the rise in its own tax rate induced by
a higher level of ½i will cause the other country to also raise its tax [eq. (16)], thus
softening tax competition in the ¯nal stage of the game. In Regime II, the second term
in (22) is zero, because the two tax rates are independent of each other. Finally, the
third term incorporates the trade-o® that exists for any given level of ¿i between being
17To see why d¿i=d½i > 0 must hold in Regime I, note that d¿i=d½i < 0 would imply ¹i > 1
from (23). In this case the third term in (22) will also be negative. Since the ¯rst term is zero in
Regime I, a negative sign of the total e®ect d¿i=d½i is thus inconsistent with an equilibrium in this
regime.
15able to tax the immobile ¯rms more heavily (the positive ¯rst e®ect) and reducing the
number of immobile ¯rms (the negative second e®ect). In both regimes, the net e®ect
in the third term is positive, if "=(1 + ") exceeds the elasticity ¹i de¯ned in (24).
We ¯rst evaluate the ¯rst-order condition (22) at ½i = 0. Since condition (15) is assumed
to hold, the resulting Nash equilibrium in the ¯nal stage must then be in Regime I.
Moreover, with ½i = 0, both the elasticity ¹i in (23) and the negative second part in the
third term are zero so that @ui=@½ij½=0 > 0 holds unambiguously. This indicates that
some tax discrimination between mobile and immobile ¯rms will always be introduced
by optimizing governments. Intuitively, introducing a small tax advantage for mobile
¯rms allows to raise the e®ective tax rate in the ¯nal stage of the game, increasing
tax revenues. On the other hand, the reduction in hi induced by a rise in ½i causes no
¯rst-order revenue losses when the initial level of tax discrimination is zero.
To analyze the conditions under which an interior Nash equilibrium in Regime I exists
in the third stage of the game, we denote by ~ ½ the level of tax discrimination that forms
the boundary between the two regimes. Note that equation (22) is not continuous at
~ ½i, because the second term is strictly positive in Regime I (see footnote 17), but zero
in Regime II. Hence the derivative @ui=@½i must be evaluated at ½ = ~ ½ from the left
(in Regime I) and from the right (in Regime II). Using (6) and (23) and noting that
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This leads to three possible scenarios. In the ¯rst case, @ui=@½ij½=~ ½ < 0 holds when ~ ½ is
approached from either side. In this case a discrimination level ~ ½ will be `too high' from
the perspective of national welfare maximization. It then follows from the continuity
of ui in ½i that there must be an optimal discrimination level ½¤
i < ~ ½i that leads to
an interior Nash equilibrium in Regime I in the ¯nal tax-setting stage. Intuitively, tax
preferences are a costly instrument for governments to use in this case, because the
decision of ¯rms to become multinationals responds elastically to tax preferences.
16In the second case, the derivatives in (25a){(25b) are both positive. Hence a further
increase in ½i will be optimal and the tax-setting equilibrium in the ¯nal stage will be
in Regime II. In this case the number of immobile ¯rms changes only little in response
to the tax preferences given to multinationals. Thus, the optimal policy is to choose
a high level of ½i in the ¯rst stage of the game, as this allows the country to tax the
immobile ¯rms at the maximum statutory rate t.
Finally, in the third case we have @ui=@½ij
I
½=~ ½ ¸ 0, but @ui=@½ij
II
½=~ ½ < 0. In this case,
the optimal policy in each country is to set ½ = ~ ½. The results of our analysis in this
section are summarized in
Proposition 3 If the elasticity with which ¯rms respond to tax preferences is high
(low), relative to the excess burden parameter, so that ¹ ¸ "=[1 + "] (¹ < "=[1 + "])
holds at ½i = ~ ½, then the non-cooperative choice of discrimination policies leads to an
interior (corner) Nash equilibrium in the ¯nal tax-setting stage.
6 Coordinating discrimination policies
The ¯nal step in our analysis is to determine whether the non-cooperative choice of
discrimination policies is e±cient from a global welfare perspective. Suppose then that
countries could coordinate, in the ¯rst stage, on a common level for the tax discrimina-
tion parameter ½, knowing that they will still set e®ective tax rates non{cooperatively
in the third stage. This setting is at the core of current policy debates in both the EU
and the OECD, where an international coordination of tax discrimination policies is
actively pursued, but countries remain free to set corporate tax rates autonomously.
Starting from a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium in either Regime I or
Regime II, the joint welfare e®ects of a marginal, coordinated increase in ½ can be
determined solely by evaluating the spillover e®ects that a small increase in country i's
discrimination policy ½i has on welfare in country j (j 6= i). The (¯rst-order) e®ect
on country i's own welfare must be zero from the optimality of the initial equilibrium,
and the simultaneous increase in ½j has identical e®ects due to the symmetry of the
model. Hence, we di®erentiate uj in equation (21) with respect to ½i and proceed in a























8 i 6= j:
Note that the ¯rst of these terms is now zero in both regimes: in Regime I, the term in
the squared bracket is zero from (13), whereas @¿j=@¿i = 0 holds in Regime II. More-
over, in Regime II we also have dhj=d½i = 0, as a change in country i's discrimination
parameter neither has a direct e®ect nor an indirect e®ect (because there is no induced
change in ¿j) on ¯rms' choices in country j. Therefore, the e®ects on country j's welfare









































< 0 8 i 6= j : (26b)
In Regime II the spillover e®ect can be readily signed from (6) and (18). An increase in
½i will induce a reduction in country i's e®ective tax rate in this regime, thus harming
country j in the ¯nal stage of the game. In Regime I, the corresponding ¯rst e®ect
is positive, as d¿i=½i > 0 must hold in this regime [cf. eq. (23) and footnote 17], and
the rise in ¿i allows country j to also raise its tax in the ¯nal stage of the game [from
eq. (16)]. However, anticipating the tax increase in the ¯nal stage, some additional ¯rms
in country j will choose a multinational form (dhj=d½i < 0) so that the second term
in (26a) is negative. Nonetheless it can be shown that the ¯rst e®ect must dominate in
this regime, and a small increase in country i's discrimination policy raises welfare in
country j. The proof requires a detailed calculation of the comparative static e®ects of
the model and is relegated to Appendix 2. We can then state:
Proposition 4 If the elasticity with which ¯rms change their organizational form is
su±ciently high (low), so that an interior (corner) equilibrium results in the ¯nal stage,
then a small coordinated increase (reduction) in the tax preferences given to mobile
¯rms must be jointly welfare increasing.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 4 shows that the implications for welfare-improving changes in coordination
policies are exactly opposed in the two regimes that underlie our analysis. In Regime I,
18a higher level of ½i will lead to less aggressive tax competition (that is, a higher e®ec-
tive tax rate) by country i in the ¯nal stage of the game, thus relaxing the constraint
for country j's choice of capital tax rate. In this regime, non-cooperative discrimina-
tion policies thus lead to a Nash equilibrium with too few tax advantages granted to
internationally mobile ¯rms. In Regime II, in contrast, a coordinated increase in the
discrimination parameters aggravates the exogenous constraint on statutory tax rates.
This reduces the e®ective taxation of mobile ¯rms in the ¯nal stage of the game, low-
ering welfare in both countries. In this case the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in
Regime II thus features too many tax advantages granted to multinational ¯rms.
So far our analysis in this section has been con¯ned to small coordinated changes in
discrimination policies, starting from a non-cooperative equilibrium. What is the degree
of tax discrimination that maximizes joint welfare in our model? Within Regime II,
equation (26b) shows that welfare must monotonously decline with the degree of tax
preferences. In Regime I our previous analysis has shown that the net e®ect in (26a)
is positive for a small increase in ½ above the non{cooperative level. It is not clear,
however, that ½ should be increased all the way to the boundary between the two
regimes, given by ~ ½. The reason for this ambiguity is that the bene¯ts of decreased tax
competition may be o®set by the increases in total ¯xed costs incurred by ¯rms.
Whether discrimination should be increased or decreased within Regime I is determined
by the elasticity of ¯rm structure with respect to the coordinated tax advantage ½¿ of









> 0 ; (27)
where the second step uses (20). In Appendix 3 we derive a condition for ´ which
ensures that coordinated increases ½ are welfare-enhancing throughout Regime I:
Proposition 5 The optimal coordinated discrimination policy cannot exceed ~ ½. If ´ ·
"=(1 + "), then the optimal coordinated discrimination policy equals ~ ½, and maximizes
the e®ective tax rate set in the last stage of the game.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Hence, if ´ is su±ciently low, then the gain in tax revenues resulting from a joint
increase in ½ dominates the induced increase in ¯rms' ¯xed costs throughout Regime I.
19In this case countries will jointly choose the discrimination policy that induces each
one of them to levy the highest possible level of ¿ in the non-cooperative ¯nal stage of
the game. But this level is reached just at the boundary between the two regimes, as
¿ is rising in ½ in Regime I, but falling in ½ in Regime II.
Finally, note the similarity between Proposition 5 and our earlier result on optimal
non-cooperative discrimination policies in Proposition 3. In both cases the valuation of
public goods, "=(1 + "), acts as a critical threshold which determines whether either a
unilateral increase in discrimination policies (implying a comparison with the elasticity
¹i) or a coordinated increase in ½ (implying a comparison with ´) are welfare-enhancing.
It is shown in Lemma 1 of Appendix 2 that ´ < ¹i must hold in the relevant case
where both elasticities are below unity. Hence there is a positive parameter range
´ < "=(1 + ") < ¹i where the uncoordinated equilibrium is in Regime I, but the
coordinated optimum requires ½ = ~ ½, on the boundary between regimes.
7 Discussion
At a basic level, the distinction between two regimes in our model incorporates in a
single framework the two benchmark cases that have been introduced in previous work
on corporate tax discrimination. Janeba and Peters (1999) distinguish exogenously
between a tax base that is costlessly mobile internationally and an immobile domestic
tax base in each country. This setting corresponds to our model in the special case where
the elasticity with which ¯rms adjust their organizational form is zero. Corresponding
to the results of Janeba and Peters, this case is associated in our analysis with maximum
taxation of the immobile factor in the ¯nal stage (Regime II, see Proposition 3) and
excessive tax preferences granted to MNEs (Proposition 4). In contrast, Keen (2001)
assumes that both tax bases are internationally mobile to some degree. In this setting,
coordinated restrictions on tax preferences are globally welfare-reducing, as they will
make tax competition more aggressive. While the set-up of our model is di®erent, its
implications are similar to Keen's when an interior Nash equilibrium in taxes occurs
in the ¯nal stage (Regime I). Moreover, due to the sequential nature of decisions in
our model, the positive relationship between the tax discrimination parameter and the
e®ective tax rate is explicitly incorporated as a comparative static e®ect [eq. (17)].
20There is, however, an important di®erence between our work and that of both Janeba
and Peters (1999) and Keen (2001). In the two latter analyses, the trade-o® for tax
policy arises at the tax-setting stage: the constraint to impose equal tax rates on both
bases (the elimination of tax preferences for the more mobile base) increases the equi-
librium tax on the mobile base, relative to the unconstrained case, but simultaneously
lowers the tax rate on the less mobile base. As shown by Janeba and Smart (2003), the
net e®ect on tax revenues then depends on the elasticity of each tax base with respect
to a single country's tax rate on the one hand, and with respect to a coordinated tax
change on the other. In the present model, in contrast, an increase in the tax prefer-
ences granted to mobile ¯rms increases, in a Regime I equilibrium, the e®ective tax rate
levied on the immobile and on the mobile tax base. Hence, there is no trade{o® for tax
policy at this stage. However, the mix between the mobile and the immobile tax base
changes in our analysis, whereas this is held ¯xed in previous work. Hence the elasticity
with which ¯rms change their organizational form in response to tax incentives is the
single core parameter in our model, which determines the nature of the equilibrium.
How is the critical value for this elasticity a®ected by the assumptions of the model? A
¯rst modi¯cation considers the case where the ¯rms' costs of investing in a subsidiary
are not treated as a pure waste, for example because the multinational structure simul-
taneously saves on transportation or factor costs. This change a®ects the last term in
the ¯rst-order condition for the choice of discrimination policy [eq. (22)], as the costs
of a change in the number of immobile ¯rms are weighed only by " (instead of 1 + ").









= " ¿i hi (1 ¡ ¹i):
All qualitative results remain unchanged in this case, but the condition for a corner
tax equilibrium (Regime II) to occur in the ¯nal stage is now ¹i < 1. Since this
condition is weaker than in the main part of the analysis (where ¹i < "=[1 + "]), it
becomes more likely that high tax preferences are given to multinational ¯rms in the
¯rst stage, and the taxation of immobile ¯rms in the last stage reaches the upper
bound.18 The reasons for this change are obvious: the `costs' of a discriminatory tax
18The same result is obtained when countries care only about tax revenues. Under this assumption
the valuation of public goods is in¯nitely high, relative to private consumption ["=(1 + ") ! 1].
21policy are reduced, as each government now considers only the loss in tax revenue when
¯rms choose a multinational structure.
Moreover, we have assumed throughout our analysis that countries can commit to a
long-term discrimination policy. Consider now the e®ects when countries can adjust
their discrimination policy after ¯rms have decided on their organizational structure.
There are several possible sequences of events if countries' power to commit to tax pref-
erences is weak. Suppose ¯rst that they are still able to coordinate on tax preferences,
so that ¯rst ¯rms choose their organizational structure, then countries coordinate on
tax preferences, and then they choose tax rates non-cooperatively. With organizational
form ¯xed, (26a){(26b) imply that countries' joint payo® is increasing in ½ throughout
Regime I, and decreasing in ½ throughout Regime II. Thus they will always choose to
set ½ = ~ ½ in coordinating their discrimination policies. If ´ < "=(1+") this is the same
outcome as would occur if they moved ¯rst: commitment carries no advantage. But if
the elasticity ´ is su±ciently high, countries will do better if they can commit.
If commitment power was weaker yet, countries might not even be able to coordinate
on ½. In this situation, ¯rms would move ¯rst, and then countries would choose their
tax rates and tax preferences simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Choosing ½i and ti
simultaneously e®ectively decouples the taxation of mobile and immobile ¯rms. Each
country would tax immobile ¯rms at the highest rate possible, and compete for mobile
¯rms as in the standard tax competition model. This equilibrium would necessarily be
in Regime II in our model. Hence, the outcome will be unambiguously worse than if
countries can coordinate on a common level of tax preferences, ~ ½, prior to ¯rms' choice
of organizational form.
Note, ¯nally, that a ¯rst-best equilibrium, where all taxes are lump-sum, is not feasible
in our model, even when countries can cooperatively determine whether to grant any
tax relief to mobile ¯rms. This is ensured by the assumption of a negative lower bound
on the ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs of becoming a multinational (c < 0). This assumption
implies that there will always be some mobile ¯rms, even if there are no tax advan-
tages to being mobile. This model element incorporates the obvious fact that there
are multiple reasons for choosing a multinational structure, and tax savings are only
one of them. An alternative assumption that yields the same qualitative results would
have been to introduce convex costs to the government of preventing tax shifting by
22multinational ¯rms (Kant, 1988). In this case, it is too costly for each government to
prevent pro¯t shifting completely, giving ¯rms with positive, yet small, ¯xed costs an
incentive to choose the mobile type in equilibrium. Hence, in this alternative scenario,
tax competition will again take place in the ¯nal stage of the game.
8 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed a sequential game between two symmetric countries when
¯rms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings and governments
are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies. The fundamental trade-
o® for governments in this setting is that granting tax breaks to MNEs softens tax
rate competition in the ¯nal stage of the game, but a preferential tax policy also
provides incentives for ¯rms to choose a multinational structure with the sole purpose
of bene¯tting from tax breaks. The non-cooperative equilibrium in tax discrimination
strategies and corporate tax rates can be in one of two regimes. If the ¯rms' choice
of organizational structure is rather insensitive to tax preferences, then countries will
choose a high degree of tax discrimination in the ¯rst stage, and maximum taxation
of immobile ¯rms in the last. If, however, the ¯rms' organizational structure responds
elastically to tax preferences, then countries will choose moderate tax preferences for
mobile ¯rms in the ¯rst stage and interior levels of tax rates in the last.
These results o®er one possible reason why tax breaks for multinational ¯rms are lim-
ited in practice, despite the high mobility of this tax base. In setting their discrimination
policy, governments take into account the incentives given to ¯rms to invest in a multi-
national structure, in order to reduce tax payments in subsequent periods. At the same
time our discussion has pointed out the advantages to governments of committing to
(empirically observed) long-run policies with respect to both pro¯t-shifting rules and
discrete tax breaks for multinationals ¯rms. This policy avoids what can be termed
a reverse hold-up problem: if tax discrimination were perceived by ¯rms to change in
the short run, there would be an incentive for them to overinvest in a multinational
structure, in order to pressure governments to grant additional tax breaks.
Our analysis can be applied to the recent policy moves in both the European Union and
the OECD, which aim at reducing the tax preferences in favour of multinational ¯rms,
23but leave national governments full autonomy over capital tax rates. Our results suggest
that these coordination measures may have rather di®erent e®ects. The EU's Code of
Conduct (European Communities, 1998) and the OECD's (1998) guidelines against
`harmful tax practices' address practices in which individual countries try to `ring-fence'
their domestic tax bases by tailoring tax breaks to foreign-based ¯rms without granting
domestic ¯rms (even domestic multinationals) the same bene¯ts. Hence, countries need
not fear that domestic ¯rms respond to tax preferences by changing their organizational
form. In this setting the `costs' of granting generous tax preferences are thus small, and
the non-cooperative equilibrium is likely characterized by strong tax preferences for
multinational ¯rms. Hence, according to our model, a coordinated reduction in these
tax preferences is indeed likely to raise revenues and welfare in each country.
In contrast, tax advantages conferred to MNEs via transfer pricing opportunities are a
costly instrument from the perspective of national governments, as they give domestic
¯rms an incentive to change their organizational form. When this response is su±ciently
elastic, the non-cooperative equilibrium will feature only moderate tax advantages
through transfer pricing. Coordinated e®orts to reduce these tax shifting opportunities,
such as the current proposal to tax multinationals on the basis of an allocation formula
(European Commission, 2001) then have the potential to render tax rate competition
more aggressive, and hence be welfare-reducing.
Our analysis has emphasized the incentives that long-term tax savings give to ¯rms
in choosing their organizational form. This choice has become a standard one in the
new trade theory, but it has so far been almost completely neglected in the literature
on international taxation. Moreover, we are aware of only one empirical study which
explicitly analyzes the e®ect of taxes on the fundamental decision to become a multi-
national ¯rm, rather than export from the home base (Devereux and Gri±th, 1998).
While this study does not ¯nd a signi¯cant impact of taxes on this decision margin,
it also does not incorporate special tax preferences of the type analyzed here. Clearly,
more theoretical and empirical work would be justi¯ed to answer the basic issue of how
much taxes contribute to the fundamental decision of ¯rms to choose a multinational
structure.
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27Appendix 1 : Avoiding Discrete Jumps in Tax Rates
Suppose that country 2 chooses the e®ective tax rate ¿I < f0(e)=(1 + ½). As country
1 increases ¿1 above ¿I, it will lose mobile capital. The assumption that the country's
payo® function is quasi-concave (when hi < ki) implies that country 1's payo® decreases
as it increases ¿1 further, if ¿1 is already greater than its best response to ¿2 = ¿I.
However, if ¿1 gets high enough, all mobile capital may move to country 2. This will be
the case, at a tax rate ¿1 less than the maximum possible rate ¹ t=(1+½), if the following
condition holds
f






If (A.1) holds, then there is some ¿0 2 [¿I;f0(e)=(1 + ½)] such that h1 = k1 at ¿1 = ¿0.
In this case further increases in ¿1 above ¿0 have no impact on k1, as k1 = h1. Raising
¿1 above ¿0 must then increase the payo® to country 1, as aggregate income of its
residents is unchanged, but more income will be diverted to the public sector.
Therefore, country 1's optimal policy, given that the other country has set an e®ective
tax rate of ¿I, is either to choose its interior best response ¿1 = ¿I, or to choose the
maximal possible e®ective tax rate f0(e)=(1+½), and lose all mobile capital. The payo®
to the ¯rst policy is
f(e) + "¿
I(e + ½h) (A.2)





0(2e ¡ h) ¡ ¿
I¤
(e ¡ h) (A.3)
Thus, given that (A.1) holds, the country will wish to `deviate' by specializing in
immobile capital only if
¢ ´ "[f
0(e)h ¡ ¿
I(e + ½h)] ¡ [f(e) ¡ f(h)] + [f
0(2e ¡ h) ¡ ¿
I](e ¡ h) > 0: (A.4)
If there were no ¯rms with negative ¯xed costs of multinational form, so that h equalled
0 for very low values of ½, then condition (A.4) would have to hold when h = e. But
our assumption on the cost of multinational form ensures that h is bounded below e,
for all values of ½.




I(e + ½h)] ¡ [f(e) ¡ f(h)] + [f
0(e) ¡ ¿
I](e ¡ h) > 0:
From concavity we also have that f(e) ¡ f(h) > f0(e)(e ¡ h), implying
¢ < "f
0(e)h ¡ ¿
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(1 + ")¾ + 2
: (A.7)
Condition (A.7) is a su±cient condition (but not a necessary one) for ¿1 = ¿2 = ¿I
to be a Nash equilibrium to the tax{setting stage when ¿I < ¿M: it implies that a
deviation by either country to a maximal statutory tax rate would reduce its payo®.
The condition must hold if " is su±ciently large, or ¾ su±ciently small.19
Condition (A.7) implies fairly weak restrictions on the parameters. For example,
Chirinko et al (1999) estimate a value of about 0:25 for the elasticity ¾. If this is
the case, as long as at least 12 percent of capital were mobile, then condition (A.7)
would have to hold for any positive value of for ".
19Whenever ¾ (1+")=" < 2, the right side of condition (A.7) must exceed 1. This implies ¿I > ¿M,
so that the tax-setting equilibrium must be in Regime II.
29Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
If ½1 = ½2 initially, and if the symmetric third{stage tax{setting equilibrium is in
Regime I, then the equilibrium values of ¿1, ¿2, h1 and h2 can be de¯ned as the solution
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g(c)dc = 0 8 i 2 f1;2g: (A.9)















2 = 0: (A.10)
Equation (A.8) de¯nes the reaction curve for a country in the ¯nal, tax-setting stage.






i 6= j : (A.11)
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The determinant of the matrix on the left side of equation (A.12) is
¢ = A + B
where
A ´














Cramer's Rule then shows the e®ects on the subsequent stages of a unilateral change







30From the de¯nition of the elasticity of ¯rm structure with respect to the tax advantages





















() 1 ¡ ¹i =
A
A + B
(1 ¡ ´); (A.16)
where the de¯nition of ¹i in the main text [eq. (24)] has been used. It follows that at
a symmetric equilibrium in Regime I:
Lemma 1 If ´ < 1 (´ > 1) then ´ < ¹ < 1 (´ > ¹ > 1).
Further, equation (A.12) implies that
dhj
d½i
= (1 ¡ ´)




j 6= i; (A.17)
so that an increase in one country's tax preferences will decrease the number of immo-
bile ¯rms in the other country if ´ < 1.
For the response of a country's e®ective tax rate with respect to its own tax preference
parameter, Cramer's Rule gives
d¿i
d½i










so that d¿i=d½i > 0 if and only if ´ < 1. Moreover, if ´ < 1, then d¿j=d½i > 0 also holds
from the fact that reaction curves slope up near a symmetric equilibrium.




















if the third{stage equilibrium is in Regime I. From the de¯nition of ¹, and equa-








Using (A.19) and (A.17), and noting that "(e+½h) = (1+")¿i(@ki=@¿i) from (13), the

















(1 + ")½2g(½¿)"(1 ¡ ´)(1 + 2")
¡4f00(e) (A + B)
: (A.20)































This implies that @uj=@½ij
I > 0 when
(3 + 4")[1 ¡ "(1 ¡ ¹)] ¡
1
2




The left side of inequality (A.21), viewed as a function of " alone (and treating the
other parameters as constants) is a concave function. It is also positive when " = 0.
Since ¹ ¸ "=(1+") if the non-cooperative equilibrium leads to an outcome in Regime I,
the left side of (A.21) must be positive when " = 1. Therefore
Lemma 2 If 0 · " · 1, then a coordinated increase in the tax preference parameter ½
must increase the payo® to each country, starting from a non{cooperative equilibrium
which implies an outcome in Regime I.


















(1 ¡ ´) (1 + ") ½ ´ " h2(1 + 2")
(A + B) [¡4f00(e)]
Since ´ < 1 at any non{cooperative equilibrium leading to an outcome in Regime I,









´ ½ h (1 + ") (1 + 2")
[¡4f00(e)]
> 0:





At the non{cooperative equilibrium ´ < 1. The right side of inequality (A.22) equals 1
when " = 1, and is an increasing function of ". Therefore
Lemma 3 If " ¸ 1, then a coordinated increase in the tax preference parameter ½ must
increase the payo® to each country, starting from a non{cooperative equilibrium which
implies an outcome in Regime I.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together complete the proof of Proposition 4, if the ¯nal-stage
equilibrium is in Regime I. ¤
32Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 5
Equation (26b) establishes that a reduction in ½i must increase uj throughout
Regime II. In Regime I, consider the e®ect of a coordinated change in ½. Equations




g(c)dc = 0 (A.23)









h(e + 2½h) ´
½[e + (1 + ´)½h]
(A.24)
where the superscript c is used to denote a simultaneous (coordinated) policy change

















In a symmetric equilibrium, where each country employs a level of capital ki = e, the
payo® u to each country's government can thus be written as
u = f(e) ¡
Z ½¿
¡1







Note that a coordinated increase in ½ must increase the number of mobile ¯rms in
each country [from equation (A.24)]. Thus a necessary condition for this increase to be
welfare{improving is that total tax revenue rises. If ´ ¸ 1, then equation (A.25) shows
that ¿, and hence tax revenue falls. Therefore ´ < 1 is a necessary condition for an
increase in ½ to increase utility in each country.
But using (A.25) and (A.26), du=d½ can be shown to be proportional to
2"(e + ½h) ¡ ´ [2" (e + ½h) + e + 2½h]






holds in Regime I. From this follows that u will be monotonously increasing in ½
throughout Regime I when ´ < "=(1 + "). ¤
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